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Abstract    
China has, in the recent decades, has consolidated its 
interests in the South Asian region. This change in 
China‟s foreign policy, from a focus on the North-East 
and South-East Asia, hints at an attempt to sustain 
China‟s own peaceful rise. India, on the other hand, has 
emphasised on a „Look East‟ foreign policy in the recent 
times. Both India and China share an important 
diplomatic relationship with Maldives. However, China‟s 
growing influence in Maldives might be a serious 
strategic concern to India. This article is an exploratory 
study of the relationship that China shares with Maldives 
and its implications to India. 
Keywords: China-Maldives relations, Politics, Military, Tourism. 
Introduction 
The way the foreign policy of China has evolved in recent decades 
to consolidate its interests could be an object lesson to other 
countries. Initially, China‟s Asian policy focused on North-East and 
South-East Asia. But in recent times, South Asia has gained 
tremendous importance in China‟s foreign policy, which currently 
aims to maintain and promote regional peace and stability and, in 
consequence, sustain China‟s own peaceful rise. Also, as India 
began to look eastward, China began to look southward to counter 
India‟s rise. In this context, South Asia constitutes an important 
region for China‟s strategic ambit, and Maldives is no different. 
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China-Maldives Relations: The Factors 
Maldives was not strategically vital for the colonial rulers. The 
archipelagic nation being poorly endowed with resources and an 
insalubrious climate, with its terrain being dotted with dangerous 
coral reefs. India was an exception in that, it commenced 
diplomatic ties with its South Asian neighbour quite early, and 
unlike China, India established its ties immediately after Maldives 
attained independence from British colonial rule in 1965. Thus, 
China ties with Maldives, began late, however it has deepened in 
recent times.  
Political and Military Ties 
China‟s relations with Maldives began slowly, but intensified with 
China‟s quest for global power. Maldives in October 1972 
established formal relations with China, when the Chinese 
ambassador to Sri Lanka was concurrently accredited to Maldives. 
The two countries‟ bilateral relations improved with high-level 
visits between the two countries, which began with the Maldives 
Foreign Minister Jamil‟s visit to China in 1980, followed by 
President Maumoon Gayoom‟s visit in 1984. This trend intensified 
in the 1990s, as Maldives became vital for China‟s interest in 
providing safe passage to its merchant ships and accessing the sea 
lanes in the Indian Ocean.  Since then, the relations have improved 
further, with bilateral high-level visits. The Maldives Foreign 
Minister and Defence and National Security Minister have 
regularly visited China. This has been reciprocated by Chinese 
Foreign Minister, Vice-Chairperson of the Standing Committee of 
the National People‟s Congress, Chairman of the Central 
Committee, General Chief of Staff of the PLA and Premier 
respectively in 1980 and 1990s.  
In 2002 the two countries celebrated the 30th anniversary of the 
establishment of their bilateral diplomatic relations, with President 
Jiang Zemin and Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan exchanging 
congratulatory messages with President Gayoom and Foreign 
Minister Jameel, respectively. In September 2002, at the invitation 
of China‟s Central Military Commission, the Maldives State 
Minister of Defence and National Security visited China, which 
was the first official contact between the Chinese and Maldives 
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armies. President Gayoom‟s visit in September 2006 further 
deepened the relations between the two countries. Maldives 
opened its embassy in Beijing in May 2009, and Ahmed Latheef 
was appointed as Maldives‟ first Ambassador to China. Party 
delegations from Maldives also visited China, to further ensure 
diplomatic cohesion. The visit by President Xi Jinping to Maldives 
in September 2014, in his first visit to South Asia, in a way 
indicated the balance-of-power dimension with India. President Xi 
was accompanied by a 100-member business delegation, 
demonstrating the economic focus of the visit. 
In 2012, China and Maldives celebrated the 40th anniversary of the 
establishment of their formal bilateral ties, with Wu Bangguo, the 
Chairman of China‟s Standing Committee of the National People‟s 
Congress of China visiting Maldives. This was the first of its kind 
by a top Chinese legislator to the island. Bangguo emphasized 
during his visit that the relationship could be developed as a model 
between big and small nations. He also expressed the desire to 
open a Chinese Embassy in Maldives and promised to increase 
China‟s aid to Maldives to US $15.4 million. Direct flights were 
announced to Maldives and scholarships were offered to Maldivian 
students in 2012 and 2013. In September 2013, a government 
delegation from Maldives attended the International Day of Peace 
Activities in China and the China-South Asia Peace and 
Development Forum. Political ties were further deepened with 
China opening its Embassy in Maldives in January 2014. It may be 
noted that China is the only non-South Asian country to set up an 
Embassy in Maldives, in order to cater for the needs of the large 
number of Chinese tourists visiting the archipelagic nation. 
A military aid agreement was signed between the two countries in 
2012. Initially, China‟s interest was to set up a military base in 
Maldives. But this objective has now taken a back seat with Sri 
Lanka forthcoming in meeting some of China‟s key maritime 
interests and with China not interested in antagonising the US and 
India, who are other security partners of Maldives. Nevertheless, 
there are reports that Beijing is still wooing Male to pre-empt a US 
move to set up a new military base in Maldives‟ southernmost 
island of Gan. 
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Trade, Investment and Aid 
Economic and technological cooperation between China and 
Maldives has also been growing over the years since 1981. Direct 
trade between the two countries has been growing since 1982, 
reaching US $2.977 million in 2002, of which Maldives exports were 
worth just US $2000, the imports from China being mainly rice and 
consumer goods. Bilateral trade went up to US $64 million in 2010, 
a rise of 56 per cent from 2009. With China providing concessional 
loans and investments to Maldives particularly in the fisheries 
sector and aquatic products, bilateral trade increased to US $98 
million in 2013 and US $104 in 2014. In recent times, China is an 
emerging market for Maldives marine products like yellow-fin 
tuna and sea cucumber. Furthermore, the two countries have 
initiated a feasibility study on free trade agreement (FTA) in 
February 2015. According to the Maldives Minister for Fisheries 
and Agriculture, “The biggest advantage of the free trade will go 
towards fishermen. With the free trade, 12 per cent export duty will 
be gone, thus the 12 per cent becomes profit for fishermen”.  
There are a number of reasons for the growing bilateral economic 
ties, like several bilateral agreements and Memorandums of 
Understanding (MOUs), such as the Agreements on Economic and 
Technical Cooperation, Mutual Exemption of Visas and Visa Fees, 
on Education Cooperation, on Cultural Cooperation and various 
other important areas of mutual interest. These agreements have 
increased the number of Maldivian people visiting China for trade 
and business, in a way making China a most preferred destination 
for Maldivian traders. Apart from this, Maldives‟ liberal trade 
regime, increase in the number of Chinese tourists to Maldives, and 
China offering its state owned companies preferential loans to 
enable them to contribute to infrastructure building in the island,  
have strengthened the bilateral economic ties. The preference for 
China for Maldives‟ economic growth was well articulated by 
President Abdulla Yameen in November 2014 in that “Western 
colonial powers‟ ” economic cooperation with China does not 
challenge Maldives‟ Islamic identity. 
On the investment front, Beijing is actively involved in several 
renewable energy projects, tourism and telecommunication sectors 
in Maldives. The Chinese investment increased from 1985 onwards. 
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By the end of 2001, the accumulated volume for Chinese companies 
contracted projects in Maldives reached $46.37 million, with their 
turnover reaching $40 million. The projects included a 1000 
Housing Units Project in Hulhumale, the National Museum, 
housing for the Ministry of Culture and Heritage, roads, and 
drainage systems in Male. Significant major Chinese investments in 
Maldives include the bridge project connecting the airport and the 
capital. This has helped the archipelagic nation‟s tourism by 
ensuring that 30 to 40 per cent of the tourists are Chinese. To attract 
more investment and trade from China, Maldives has set up an 
office in Kunming, China. 
Chinese investment in Maldives got a boost with Vice President 
Mohamed Jameel Ahmed visiting China in June 2014, followed by 
President Xi Jinping‟s visit. The two countries agreed to cooperate 
on developing Special Economic Zones (SEZ) and construction of 
harbours and bunkering facilities. The contract to expand Male 
airport was given to the Beijing Urban Construction Group after 
the Maldivian government cancelled a $511 million deal with 
India‟s GMR Infrastructure two years earlier. When India protested 
this development, the Maldivian government emphasized that the 
Chinese firm does not have the right to run the airport for security 
reasons. An agreement has also been signed for the Male-Hulhule 
bridge, connecting the capital with its international airport. 
President Xi Jinping said in Male that he hoped that the bridge 
would be named China-Maldives Friendship Bridge.  
In a significant move, on 22 July 2015, the Maldivian Parliament 
(Majlis) amended the constitution and approved by 70 votes (14 
against) foreign ownership of land in the country, which many 
argue will be beneficial to China. Members of Parliament voting 
against the move said that allowing investment of more than $1 
billion could be used by China for its military expansion in the 
Indian Ocean region and would be detrimental to Maldivian 
national security interests. India also expressed its concern. But the 
Maldivian government argued that the bill was intended to 
strengthen Maldives‟ economic ties with China, rather than 
military ties. It may be noted, however, that if China‟s level of 
economic activity in Maldives increases exponentially, China may 
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usurp India‟s advantage of being Maldives‟ third-largest trading 
partner.  
Over the decades, Chinese aid and investment to Maldives have 
also deepened the economic ties. China‟s aid to Maldives in the 
1970s was RMB74.7875 million. As noted earlier, Beijing, as a part 
of its aid programme, constructed a building to house the Maldives 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, a National Museum, and is involved in 
the 1000 Housing Units Project.  President Abdulla Yameen visited 
China in August 2014 and secured a $16 million grant aid from 
China, which is expected to cover the costs partly of the Malé-
Hulhule Bridge and other projects. China also provided emergency 
aid in December 2014 when Male‟s sewage treatment plant suffered 
a fire, leaving some 100,000 people without access to safe drinking 
water. It sent nearly 700 tons of fresh water and a Chinese Navy 
submarine rescue ship named Changxing, which could produce 
over 70 tons of desalted water every day. Hence trade, investment 
and aid over the years have transformed the bilateral ties, for the 
benefit of both the countries.  
Tourism  
The tourism industry accounts for about 70 per cent of Maldives‟ 
GDP, both direct and indirect via transportation, communication, 
and construction sectors. Maldives attracts a million tourists 
annually, of which Chinese tourists numbered 35,000 in 2008-9, and 
it increased to 363,626 in 2014, which accounted for one-third of 
arrivals, with 30 per cent market share. Boosting the Chinese 
arrivals are, besides the resplendent beauty of the archipelago, 
direct flights from Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, Kunming, 
Chengdu, Chongqing and Hong Kong to Maldives. Chinese 
companies are also involved in promoting tourism in Maldives like 
China Union Pay (CUP), which has begun cash withdrawal 
services for cardholders in 95 per cent of ATM in Maldives after 
entering into partnership with Maldives‟ biggest bank in March 
2010. Apart from this, a joint venture has been initiated between the 
two countries to expand tourism. For example, China‟s Guandong 
Beta Ocean and a Maldivian company were awarded Vaavu Atoll 
Kunaavashi to develop a five-star luxury resort with some 142 
rooms. The Maldivian Tourism Ministry in May 2014 also signed 
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an MOU with the state-owned China Machinery Engineering 
Corporation (CMEC) to develop Thaa Atoll Kalhufahalafushi as a 
resort. The Tourism Ministry has also launched the Visit Maldives 
Year 2016 campaign in its efforts to boost tourism to the country. 
Maritime Dimension 
Initially, China‟s objective in Maldives was to establish a military 
base in the archipelagic nation. The objective has, however, evolved 
in course of time leading to the following Xi-Yameen joint 
statement in September 2014:  
“We have agreed to jointly build the 21st Century 
Maritime Silk Road and take this opportunity to 
enhance cooperation in the fields of maritime 
economy, maritime security, ocean research, 
environment protection, and disaster prevention. 
We will also try to start some key projects that can 
yield quick results, at an early date”.  
By endorsing MSR, Maldives seeks to promote itself as a vital 
trade-cum-transit port. China is encouraging this ambition by 
mapping the MSR through the Ihavandhippolhu Integrated 
Development Project, or iHavan which is in the northernmost atoll 
of Maldives. Thus, in recent times, the maritime dimension has 
gained greater significance in bilateral ties.  
Why is this happening? 
India has had strong historical, cultural, political and socio-
economic relations with Maldives. But in recent years Maldives has 
developed closer ties with China. Some of the reasons why 
Maldives prefers to deal with China are as follows: 
a) Most of the Chinese projects are completed on time, unlike 
projects undertaken by Indian companies, such as the 
construction of the Indira Gandhi Memorial Hospital, which 
took an inordinately long time to complete; also, the quality 
of its construction is regarded to be poor. An important 
feature of India‟s aid diplomacy in South Asia is that while 
it is generous in extending largesse, project deadlines are 
rarely met. Also, the major part of India‟s aid goes towards 
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building capacity and developing democratic institutions, 
whose outcome is difficult to evaluate. Apparently, land 
ownership in Maldives requires $1 billion, where China has 
an advantage as its investment policy is friendly and less 
bureaucratic. In India, it would be difficult to get consensus 
on investing such a huge amount. According to Prof. 
Mahendra P. Lama, a South Asia analyst, China‟s political 
system allows it to go ahead with huge investment without 
concerning itself about domestic considerations, while in 
India, there are “domestic constituencies and angles to look 
into before starting a project in a foreign land”. Also, 
according to Prof. Lama, India has only “conventional 
cultural, economic or diplomatic ties and has not been able 
to create and establish any strong Indian constituencies, and 
our policy towards Maldives has been heavily government-
centric.” 
b) Human rights, democracy and rule of law play a vital role 
in determining India‟s relations with other countries, which 
is not the case with China. For example, when recently the 
Government of India protested against the ill treatment 
meted out to the former President Nasheed by the present 
Yameen government, the Maldivian Foreign Minister, 
Dunya Maumoon, remarked his government “will not take 
instructions from a foreign government [India]”. Even 
earlier, the Indian government imposed travel restrictions 
and some economic sanctions in response to any move to 
destabilising democracy in the archipelagic nation. On the 
other hand, responding to the current political crisis in 
Maldives, the Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Hong 
Lei remarked that the issue “is the domestic matter of the 
Maldives. ... China upholds the principle of non-
interference in other countries‟ domestic affairs. We believe 
the Maldivian side can deal with its domestic affairs 
properly.” 
c) From time to time, China has come up with big selling 
ideas, which are being positively endorsed by the 
neighbouring countries. For example, the Maldives 
government has backed the Chinese-initiated Asian 
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Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). It has also 
responded positively to China‟s proposal for an FTA, which 
is now being pursued. Maldives has also joined China‟s 
ambitious MSR project and its „One Belt One Road‟ 
Initiative. Thus, these Chinese initiatives have deepened the 
ties 
d) On the occasion of the Maldives‟ 50th Independence Day 
(July 2015), Prime Minister Narendra Modi called Maldives 
a “valued partner” of India, but in reaction to the ill 
treatment meted out to former President Nasheed, he did 
not visit Maldives during his tour of Indian Ocean countries 
in August 2015. Even India‟s Foreign Secretary S. Jaishankar 
had to postpone his visit to Maldives during his SAARC 
Yatra for five months, indicating India‟s displeasure with 
Maldives‟ internal developments.  Thus, all these aspects 
has influenced Maldives to engage with China, rather than 
with India.  
India’s Response  
India, enjoys a strong historical, diplomatic and cultural ties with 
Maldives. However, bilateral ties have been challenged by China‟s 
footprint in Maldives. In this context, India‟s response has been to 
work on the strong historical foundations. New Delhi was among 
the first countries to establish diplomatic ties with Male. Although 
India always emphasizes on promoting democracy, it extended 
support to the authoritarian rule of Maldivian President Maumoon 
Gayoom for thirty years. India even sent its naval contingent to 
stymie an attempt to overthrow the Gayoom government by some 
Sri Lanka-based dissidents in 1988. Over the decades, New Delhi 
has been Male‟s Big Brother, the most influential foreign power in 
Maldives (and also in Bhutan). India-Maldives relations were so 
significant that Maldives even sought to purchase land in India for 
relocating its citizens in case they become environmental refugees 
as a result of climate change and rising sea levels. However, in 
recent times, Australia and the US have emerged as alternative 
options to Maldives.  
The bilateral ties have also been a result of strong naval interaction 
between the two countries. According to the Indian Ministry of 
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Defence (MOD), Maldives has more interaction with the Indian 
Navy and Coast Guard than any other country in the Indian Ocean. 
Over the decades, India has also helped Maldives set up its coastal 
surveillance capabilities. Recently, India was the first country to 
respond when Male‟s sewage treatment plant damaged, leaving 
many people without access to safe drinking water.  
India is a major economic partner of Maldives. However, the 
relationship has faced hurdles after Maldives cancelled its 
contract with GMR (an Indian company) and gave the contract to a 
Chinese company for major investment in Male airport. The Indian 
government nevertheless continues to provide development aid 
and cooperation to Maldives without any conditionality to promote 
South-South cooperation, building solidarity and partnership 
between developing nations and good-neighbourhood policy. 
Generally, in the 1980s and 1990s India‟s aid to the archipelagic 
nation went towards building its long-term educational and health 
infrastructure. However, Indian aid intensified in 2007 in response 
to China‟s mounting interest in Maldives. In a significant move, the 
Indian government has hiked its aid allocation to Maldives from $4 
million in 2014 to $30 million in 2015-16, indicating the enhanced 
priority it accords to Maldives. Although Maldives‟ share in India‟s 
total aid is just 2 per cent in 2015-16, its share has undergone a 
rough sevenfold increase from last year.  
Both India and China are striving for maritime dominance in the 
Indian Ocean Region (IOR). China has been consolidating its 
commercial maritime interest in the region, while India has given 
importance to maintaining security. In July 2013 India signed a 
tripartite maritime security agreement with Sri Lanka and 
Maldives, to address common maritime security threats, challenges 
and also to enhance security primarily through cooperative 
measures. These involve joint cooperation on exclusive economic 
zone (EEZ) surveillance, search and rescue (SAR) operations, 
working on anti-piracy efforts, sharing and tracking of merchant 
vessels using new technology. All these would be addressed 
through Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA), Long Range 
Identification and Tracking (LRIT), Merchant Ship Information 
System (MSIS) and Automatic Identification system (AIS), SAR 
coordination including training, develop marine oil pollution 
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response, and exchange of information on illegal maritime activities 
through channels of communication.  
This agreement also caters to the needs of Maldives. Although sea 
areas between India and Maldives are not chokepoints, they are 
very wide and can be termed high seas strategic passage way, 
where the bulk of merchant traffic funnels in and out. The huge 
amount of traffic might result in accidents, pollution affecting the 
marine environment, and tourism and fishing industry, on which 
Maldives direly depends. Moreover, the Somali sea piracy has 
come close to the shores of Maldives and India. There have been a 
number of incidents of capturing Somali pirates in Maldives 
waters, exposing the vulnerability of this archipelagic nation. This 
aspect is addressed in the agreement. There is also the factor of 
terrorism launched from the sea. Overall, India‟s policy towards 
Maldives is guided by its good-neighbourhood policy and 
protecting its interest in IOR. This was well articulated by India‟s 
then Prime Minister Manmohan Singh in November 2011. When 
addressing the Maldivian Parliament he said, “This is our extended 
neighbourhood, we wish to work with the Maldives and other 
likeminded countries to ensure peace and prosperity in the IOR”. 
Possibility of ‘Chindia’ (China+India) in Maldives 
Although in recent times both India and China are asserting their 
interest in Maldives, there are many areas where they can 
cooperate in their own interest and also in the interest of Maldives. 
For instance: 
a) India can assist Maldives and other littoral states in their 
quest for economic growth and it can also offer to train their 
human resources and transfer technology. China in its turn 
can enhance its aid for infrastructure development. This will 
ensure that Maldives and other Indian Ocean nations will 
progress while maintaining good relations with both China 
and India. Both countries should realise that competition 
will only lead to the small states fearing both military 
hegemony and economic monopoly, which affects the 
growth of the region.  
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b) Economic and energy security are prime strategic interests 
for India and China. The two countries are among the 
largest economies in the world and are keen to secure 
markets for exports, obtain raw materials, energy resources 
and enhance their international stature. Their economic 
resurgence is directly linked to their overseas trade and 
energy needs, most of which are transported by sea. India‟s 
imports and exports have reached $500 billion already and 
may well touch $2 trillion by 2020. Also, India depends for 
70 per cent of its fossil fuel on imports, whose figure is 
estimated to rise to 85 per cent by 2020. Many Indian 
security analysts believe that energy security will be India‟s 
prime strategic interest for the next 25 years. China also 
depends on overseas resources and energy supplies, 
especially oil and natural gas from the Persian Gulf and 
Africa. It is forecast that China‟s oil consumption would 
increase by 150 per cent by 2020 and its foreign supplies 
will be more than 75 per cent. In addition, both India and 
China want the protection of Sea Lanes of Communication 
(SLOCs), prevention of economic degradation and climate 
changes in the region. In this regard, Maldives becomes 
important as it sits along major sea lanes, including the 
East-West shipping route through which much of the 
Middle East oil headed for East Asia is transported.  The 
archipelago is located just 340 km from the Indian coast. 
c) Maldives told the United Nations in 1987 that a 2.01168 
metre rise in sea level could submerge the whole country, 
and since then it has been highlighting the issue of climate 
change at all global forums. Both India and China are 
supporting the Maldives campaign on climate change. For 
example, when the US rejected the Kyoto Pact (1997) on 
global warming, China termed it as an “irresponsible 
decision”. Both India and China have interacted with 
Maldives at successive international climate change 
negotiations, particularly at the Copenhagen summit, 2009. 
Both India and China can use new technology and support 
Maldives‟ cause at the global and regional levels.   
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d) Maldives faces a potential rise in Islamic extremism. For 
instance, in 2010 some Maldivians were arrested in Pakistan 
for terrorist activity and training at camps in South 
Waziristan. This extremism could be a threat to Maldives 
and the region, affecting the interests of both India and 
China. There is also the possibility of terrorist groups trying 
to recruit members in Maldives, which will certainly affect 
its tourism and economy. Both India and China fear that 
especially in the context of rising religious radicalism in 
Maldives, anti-India terror groups will take root there and 
seek sanctuary in the many uninhabited islands of the 
archipelago. These anxieties have prompted India and 
China to intensify cooperation with successive Maldivian 
governments. 
As regards balancing India and China in the context of Maldives, 
then President Nasheed said in May 2011: “I don‟t think we have to 
walk a tightrope. We are firstly a SAARC member country and 
China‟s friendship is about broader global interest rather than 
regional.” In the interest of Maldives and the region, both India and 
China should work on a win-win situation through cooperation, 
rather than confrontation and competition, which will affect 
Maldives‟ growth and prosperity.  
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